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I. STATEMENT OF TNE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
James Zane Parmer appeals from the Fourth Judicial District Court's Judgment of 
Conviction and Sentence entered on October 23, 2006. Mr. Parmer asserts that the district court 
erred in several respects. First, the district court erred when it granted in part the State's motions 
in limine to permit prior bad acts testimony in the State's case-in-chief. Second, the district court 
erred by permitting a witness who sat through the first trial testimony to testify in the second 
trial, in violation of the court's prior exclusion order. Finally, the district court erred in 
prohibiting the defense from introducing any testimony in the second trial relating to the 
investigating officer's interrogation of Mr. Parmer. 
B. Course o f  Proceedings 
Mr. Parmer was charged by indictment on January 10, 2006, in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, County of Ada, State of Idaho, with a single count of Lewd Conduct with a Minor 
Under Sixteen, a felony, pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-1508. (R., pp.8-9.) The Indictment 
accused Mr. Parmer of committing a lewd act on K.R., a 14-year-old female, "by manual to 
genital contact with the intent to appeal to the sexual desires of the Defendant andlor said minor 
child." (R., p.8.) The first trial resulted in a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury. (R., p.141.) The 
matter was tried to a second jury in August 2006, and a guilty verdict was returned. (R., p.271.) 
Mr. Parmer was sentenced to a unified 20-year's imprisonment, with seven years fixed. (R., 
pp.281-283.) The Judgment of Conviction was entered on October 23, 2006, and on 
December 4,2006, Mr. Parmer filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.281-289.) 
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C. Statement of the Facts 
The charge against Mr. Parmer arose out of events taking place on or about December 29, 
2005, at Mountain Land Physical Therapy in Boise, during a physical therapy appointment 
wherein Mr. Parmer was treating K.R. for leg pain. (Trial Tr., p.212, L.24 - p.214, L.8; p.216, 
Ls.4-8; p.974, L.6 - p.976, ~.5.) '  K.R.'s physical therapy services included massage and 
exercise training. (Trial Tr., p.966, L.17 - p.968, L.9.) K.R. had been referred to Mr. Parmer for 
physical therapy as a result of recurring migraine headaches. (Trial Tr., p.964, L.6 - p.965, L.8.) 
Mr. Parmer treated K.R. twice a week starting in the fall of 2005 and ending on December 29, 
2005. (Trial Tr., p.965, Ls.4-8; p.966, Ls.17-19; p.977, Ls.20-23.) Throughout the period, 
Mr. Parmer provided K.R. massages as part of treatment, which K.R. testified helped her 
migraine headaches. (Trial Tr., p.974, Ls. 13-17.) During the December 29, 2005 visit, K.R. 
complained to Mr. Parmer that she was experiencing pain in her thighs and inner thighs. (Trial 
K.R. testified that she disrobed to a gown and underwear, and then got under a blanket on 
the massage table. (Trial Tr., p.979, Ls.3-9.) Before starting the massage, K.R. testified that 
Mr. Parmer told her about a new device for massaging the head, and placed it on her head so she 
could try it. (Trial Tr., p.979, L.22 - p.980, L.15.) K.R. testified that several people were in and 
out of the room during the session. (Trial Tr., p.982, L.8 -p.983, L.6.) She testified that at some 
'The Reporter's Transcript in this case consists of four separate volumes. For ease of reference and clarity, the 
hearings will be identified by the proceeding which took place and the date of that proceeding. Because both the 
first and second trial transcripts are, with the exception of the first day of the second trial, consecutively numbered, 
the trial transcripts will be cited herein as "Trial Tr.", while the fast day of the second trial will be cited to as 
"8121106 Trial Tr." 
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point during the session, Mr. Parmer placed a vibrator on her vaginal area and put his finger 
inside her vagina. (Trial Tr., p.983, Ls.15-17.) Specifically, K.R. testified that Mr. Parmer 
placed the vibrator on her clitoris, but at that time she thought it was over the top of her 
underwear. (Trial Tr., p.984, Ls.5-9.) According to K.R.'s testimony, Mr. Parmer then used the 
vibrator to move her underwear to the side in order to gain access to her vagina with his fingers. 
(Trial Tr., p.984, Ls.10-20.) She testified that Mr. Parmer placed the vibrator back and forth 
between her thigh and clitoris several times, but put his finger inside her vagina once. (Trial Tr., 
p.985, L.12 - p.987, L.13.) When the session was over, Mr. Parmer left the room and K.R. got 
dressed. (Trial Tr., p.989, Ls.7-14.) Mr. Parmer returned and showed her some stretches, and 
then gave her a hug before she left the office. (Trial Tr., p.989, L. 15 - p.990, L.15.) K.R. 
testified that during the period she was treated by Mr. Parmer, he would work with her full body, 
including her head, neck, shoulders, back and legs. (Trial Tr., p.1003, L.15 - p.1005, L.24.) 
1. Confrontation Call and Police Interview 
K.R.'s allegations were reported to the Boise City Police, and a confrontation call was 
placed by K.R. to Mr. Parmer on the morning of December 30, 2005, and recorded by Officer 
Gilbert. (Trial Tr., p.1109, L.9 - p.1114, L.9.) The confrontation call was offered by the State 
............... .. . . ...... .... .... ... ... ... . 
and received into evidence at both trials. (Trial Tr., p.379, Ls.2-18; p.1114, L.9 - p.1116, L.6.) 
During the confrontation call neither K.R. nor Mr. Parmer mentioned anything about Mr. Parmer 
putting his fingers inside her vagina. (Trial Tr., p.1118, L.20 - p.1119, L.13.) Upon completion 
of the confrontation call, Officer Gilbert made contact with Mr. Parmer at Mountain Land 
Physical Therapy and placed him under arrest. (Trial Tr., p.1116, L.13 - p.1121, L.24.) 
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Mr. Parmer was taken to the county jail where Officer Gilbert interviewed him. (Trial Tr., p.386, 
L.4-p.390, L.2; p.1121, Ls.12-24.) 
During the first trial, the defense established through Officer Gilbert that the interview 
took place shortly after the confrontation call and that it was recorded. (Trial Tr., p.386, L.4 - 
p.390, L.2.) When the defense asked whether Mr. Parmer made an admission during the 
interview, the State objected on hearsay grounds and the district court sustained the objection. 
(Trial Tr., p.386, Ls.9-18; p.450, L.14 - p.451, L.9.) During the defense case at the f is t  trial, 
Mr. Parmer testified about the statements he made during the confrontation call and about his 
statements made to Officer Gilbert in the interview. (Trial Tr., p.711, L.4 - p.718, L.18; p.749, 
L.9-p. 750, L.19;p.824, L.24-p.826, L.17;~.843,L.9-p.847, L.20.) 
Prior to the second trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude Officer 
Gilbert's recorded interview with Mr. Parmer. (R., p.315, Conf. Exs. 7-8.) The district court 
granted the motion on I.R.E. 412 grounds, precluding the defense from offering into evidence or 
even making reference to Mr. Parmer's statements during the interview with Officer Gilbert. 
(R., pp.148-152; 08/02/06 Motion In Limine Tr., p.37, L.14 - p.40, L.21.) 
During the second trial, the defense attempted to establish that Officer Gilbert 
interviewed Mr. Parmer at the jail shortly after the confrontation call took place, but was not 
permitted to explore that area due to the district court's prior in limine ruling. (Trial Tr., p.1118, 
L.15 - p.1122, L.18; p.1816, L.4 - p.1817, L.24.) The district court also prevented the defense 
from explaining Mr. Parmer's statements during the confrontation call by reference to his 
statements to Officer Gilbert in the interview. (Trial Tr., p.1812, L.14 - p.1817, L.4.) 
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2. LR.E. 404(b) Witnesses 
On March 10,2006, the State filed a Notice of Intent to Use 404(b) Evidence ("Notice of 
Intent"), summarizing the anticipated testimony of eight females of various ages who each 
alleged various prior bad acts committed by Mr. Parmer. (R., p.315, Conf. Ex. 2.) The State 
also submitted a motion in limine and supporting brief requesting a pretrial order allowing the 
use of the anticipated testimony outlined in the Notice of Intent. (R., p.315, C o d  Exs. 3-4.) A 
hearing was held on the State's motion in limine on March 28, 2006, where the court heard 
arguments from counsel but did not hear any evidence. (3128106 Motion in Limine Tr., pp.6-31 
passim.) The district court decided the motion on the State's proffers contained in the Notice of 
Intent, the motion in limine and supporting brief, and the oral representations of the prosecutor at 
the hearing. (3128106 Motion in Limine Tr., pp.6-31 passim.) 
At the hearing, the State argued that the 404(b) evidence should be allowed because the 
defense was anticipated to be a lack of intent, accident, or mistake, and the 404(b) evidence 
bolstered the credibility of the victim and showed a common scheme or plan. (3128106 Motion in 
Limine Tr., p.8, L.3 - p.9, L.24; p.18, Ls.9-21; p.22, Ls.15-25.) The district court found the 
State's offer of proof sufficient to allow the testimony to be admitted: 
I am satisfied that, based upon the State's offer that there's more 
than adequate showing that, under the guise of whether it was 
characterized as a massage or physical therapy, that the defendant 
is engaging in otherwise legitimate contact with the apparent 
purpose of engaging in inappropriate sexual contact. 
(3128106 Motion in Limine Tr., p.25, Ls.3-10.) On the basis of the State's proffer, the district 
court granted the State's request, excluding only one of the eight witnesses identified to provide 
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I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (3/10/06 Motion in Limine Tr., p.23, L.l - p.26, L.13.) The proffered 
testimony and the actual trial testimony of each I.R.E. 404(b) witness is set forth below.2 
Gigi Caleway - In its Notice of Intent, the State proffered that Ms. Caleway would testify 
that Mr. Parmer had inappropriately touched her breast during a massage in 1988 when she was 
16 years old. (R., p.315, C o d  Ex. 2.) The facts underlying the proffer were that Ms. Caleway 
and two friends were invited to a local gym in Salmon, Idaho, where Mr. Parmer worked, to use 
the hot tub after hours. At some point, Mr. Partner offered to give her a massage and she 
accepted. During the massage, Mr. Parmer attempted to massage her stomach, massaged her 
buttocks and shoulders, and when he was told to stop, Mr. Parmer told Ms. Caleway to roll over, 
which would expose her breasts as they were not covered. Ms. Caleway complied, at which 
point Mr. Parmer massaged her shoulders and then her bare breast. 
At the first trial, however, Ms. Caleway testified that Mr. Parmer, while on the table 
straddling her, "started to kind of caress around the side, and when it got uncomfortable when he 
felt my breasts then I was annoyed and told him to stop." (Trial Tr., p.240, Ls.6-16.) She was 
asked how Mr. Parmer was positioned when he felt her breast: 
Q. Where was he when he was doing this [massaging her neck, 
shoulders and back]. 
A. At first he was just kind of off to the side, but then at one point 
he was on the table. And I know it's kind of weird, and so I 
started to get increasingly uncomfortable. 
Q. How did he get on the table? 
A. I don't know, because I was laying there. You know how you 
are kind of unaware. 
All facts relating to the proposed testimony of each I.R.E. 404(b) witness are taken directly &om the State's Notice 
of Intent, and accompanying motions and memoranda, unless otherwise specified. 
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Q. How was his body on the table? 
A. He was straddling me. On my back. 
Q. Where was he sitting? 
A. Well, I think his knees were probably the pressure on the table. 
I don't recall if he was actually touching me or using my butt 
as a seat or anything like that. 
(Trial Tr., p.239, L.22 - p.240, L.ll.) During the second trial, Ms. Caleway was asked: 
Q. How was he sitting on you? 
A. As far as the massage? 
Q. As far as his body? 
A. Yeah, I think he was silting on my buttocks. I was just really 
uncomfortable from that point on. 
(Trial Tr., p.1156, Ls.5-14.) Ms. Caleway also testified that Mr. Parmer "did the normal 
massage things. And then at times he would creep around to the side, and try to fondle my 
breasts." (Trial Tr., p.1157, Ls.1-3.) 
Carol Floyd-Hoopev - In its Notice of Intent, the State proffered that Ms. Hooper would 
testify that she was treated at the Boise YMCA by Mr. Parmer in 1999 for neck pain. (R., p.315, 
Conf. Ex. 2.) She was 42 years old at that time. During her last session, she was receiving a 
massage when Mr. Parmer had her roll over. I-Ie massaged her neck and then her breasts. "The 
defendant then rubbed Carol's vagina with his hand and sucked on her toes. The defendant then 
took off his shirt and pulled her into a seated position and pressed his groin up against her bare 
groin. Carol could feel his penis through his pants." Ms. Hooper testified in both trials that she 
had three sessions with Mr. Parmer, and that during the third massage he pressed his mouth 
against her breast and put his hand inside her vagina. (Trial Tr., p.267, L.4 - p.269, L.25; 
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Kandy Moore - In its Notice of Intent, the State proffered that Ms. Moore would testify 
about events taking place in 2000 at the Boise YMCA when she was 28 years old. (R., p.315, 
Conf. Ex. 2.) Ms. Moore would testify that "during several sessions, the defendant would brush 
her vagina with his hand during the massages. Ms. Moore will testify that during one massage, 
when the defendant touched her vagina, she sexually climaxed." She "talked with the defendant 
about her marriage being strained and the stress of her daughter recently being diagnosed with 
cancer" and was told by Mr. Parmer that he and his wife lived "separate lives." In addition, 
Ms. Moore would testify that she was talking with Mr. Parmer when he took her face in his hand 
and French kissed her, and "that she was shocked and left very quickly." During another 
session, Mr. Parmer told her to roll over, and when she did, she saw him watching her through 
the reflection in a mirror. At her last session, Ms. Moore was receiving a massage when 
Mr. Parmer kissed her, brushed his hand against her labia "causing her to become aroused," 
started rubbing her vagina, and then got up onto the massage table next to her. 
Ms. Moore testified at the first trial that during her first treatment session, she wore her 
underwear and Mr. Parmer's fingers bumped against her underwear while he massaged her leg. 
(Trial Tr., p.283, L.7 - p.284, L.13; p.286, Ls.1-lo.) She testified that "[wlhen he was rubbing 
the leg and in the front, I am trying to explain this, just a few of his fingers would rub underneath 
the underwear in the front, in vaginal area, but I felt like it wasn't on purpose." (Trial Tr., p.286, 
Ls.1-lo.) At every subsequent session, Ms. Moore decided to remove her underwear for the 
massage. (Trial Tr., p.285, Ls.13-20.) When asked how many sessions she had before the 1 
session "where it went beyond a massage," she testified: "I think there were two times." (Trial I 
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Tr., p.285 L.21 - p.286, L.1.) She also testified that "the first one I felt it was, when 1 left there, 
it was all me. After that when I did not wear underwear the next time it got very - I - I am sorry, 
this is very embarrassing." (Trial Tr., p.286, Ls.14-18.) She stated "I had my underwear on the 
first time, the next time it happened I had nothing on." (Trial Tr., p.287, Ls.10-12.) Ms. Moore 
then described a massage session when Mr. Parmer masturbated her, got on the table and they 
kissed. (Trial Tr., p.288, L.4 - p.289, L.lO.) She also testified that during her six months of 
treatment, she engaged Mr. Parmer in email conversations and that she wanted a relationship 
with Mr. Parmer. (Trial Tr., p.290, L.8 - p.292, L.16; p.296, Ls.7-25.) When asked on cross- 
examination whether the "alleged incident" took place during her last session with Mr. Parmer, 
Ms. Moore responded that "There were several incidences throughout my treatment. The last 
was the most sexual." (Trial Tr., p.294, Ls.2-10.) 
In contrast, at the second trial, Ms. Moore testified that during her first sessions with 
Mr. Parmer, she did not receive massages: "A massage was later. It wasn't the very first visit, 
no." (Trial Tr., p.1066, Ls.16-23.) During the first massage, when Mr. Parmer's fingers were 
bumping up against her underwear, she testified that she was embarrassed because she had been 
sexually aroused to the point of orgasm by the incidental touching of her labia, and that when she 
returned to work, she joked about it with a coworker. (Trial Tr., p.1105, Ls.1-18.) She further 
testified that at a subsequent massage session, Mr. Parmer had gotten on the massage table next 
to her, but added new testimony that he was also engaging in "dry sex" with her while they were 
kissing. (Trial Tr., p.1081, Ls.11-17.) She was then asked if she went back to Mr. Parmer for 
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treatment after the massage she had just testified about, and she testified: "No, that was the last 
time I was treated." (Trial Tr., p.1083, Ls.7-10.) 
Brooke Ouvada - In its Notice of Intent, the State proffered that Ms. Ourada would 
testify she was 23 years old in 2000 when she worked at the Boise Downtown YWCA as a 
personal trainer. (R., p.315, Cod. Ex. 2.) She was a runner and had suffered a hamstring injury 
and was treated by Mr. Parmer as a professional courtesy on one occasion. During a massage, 
Mr. Parmer brushed against her vagina with his fingers several times, directed her to roll onto her 
back, and when she did, he looked at her nude body. He massaged her inner thigh and again 
brushed against her vaginal area. Ms. Ourada left and did not return for Eurther treatment aRer 
that one session. At both trials, Ms. Ourada testified consistently with the information set forth 
in the State's proffer. (Trial Tr., p.308, L.ll -p.312, L.14; p.1292, L.9-p.1298, L.19.) 
Cindy Provence - In its Notice of Intent, the State proffered that Ms. Provence would 
testify that when she was 27 years old, in 2000 or 2001, she sought treatment from Mr. Parmer at 
the YMCA for a nerve problem located in her right buttock. (R., p.315, Conf. Ex. 2.) On her 
first visit, she kept her bra and underwear on and wore a gown; she laid down on her stomach 
while Mr. Parmer massaged her right buttock area. During one of the initial sessions, he 
"massaged her buttock and then moved his hand down between her legs in her vaginal area." He 
did not leave his hand there long, but it was long enough to make her uncomfortable. She 
returned to the Downtown Boise YMCA for approximately 20 sessions with Mr. Parmer after 
tha.t incident and, thereafter, was never touched inappropriately by Mr. Parmer during those 
sessions. 
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At the first and second trials, Ms. Provence testified that all her treatment sessions with 
Mr. Parmer were at the YMCA in Meridian. (Trial Tr., p.251, Ls.22-24; p.1132, Ls.9-11.) 
When she was asked whether anything ever happened during her first session with Mr. Parmer 
that made her uncomfortable, she said yes. (Trial Tr., p.252, Ls.9-25; p.1133, L.6 - p.1135, L.7.) 
She testified that his hand moved down her lower buttock toward the inner thigh but that his 
hand did not touch her vaginal area. (Trial Tr., p.253, Ls.19-21; p.1134, L.24 - p.1135, L.2.) 
When she squirmed, he moved his hand back to the upper buttock area. (Trial Tr., p.253, L.3 - 
p.254, L.3; p.1134, Ls.17-23.) At the initial session, Ms. Provence testified that she was wearing 
thong underwear, but that at each of the almost 20 sessions to follow she wore underwear that 
"would cover my whole bottom." (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.6-18; p.1135, Ls.8-12.) She testified that 
aRer the initial session, nothing ever occurred that made her uncomfortable or that she believed 
to be inappropriate. (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.17-21; p.1137, L.14 - p.1138, L.2.) Notably, the State 
represented to the district court at the Motion in Limine hearing that Mr. Parmer put his hand in 
Ms. Provence's vaginal area. (3128106 Motion in Limine Tr., p.17, Ls.22-25.) 
Jennifer Harris - In its Notice of Intent, the State proffered that Ms. Harris would testify 
that she was treated by Mr. Parmer in 2005 when she was 27 years old. (R., p.3 15, Conf. Ex. 2.) 
Ms. Harris would state that she was told to disrobe and put on a gown, but that she could leave 
her shorts on. She laid down on a massage table and Mr. Parmer massaged her neck and back 
muscles. Mr. Parmer would place his hand down the back side of her shorts and massage her 
buttocks, and up the leg opening of her "jean shorts" and massage her leg muscles. At the 
second to last of her sessions with Mr. Parmer, he massaged between her breasts. 
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At the first and second trials, Ms. Harris testified that she started seeing Mr. Parmer at 
Mountain Land in 2005 after she suffered whiplash in a motor vehicle accident. (Trial Tr., 
p.331, Ls.4-11; p.1267, Ls.18-24.) She was asked in the first trial whether anything happened 
out of the ordinary during the first couple of treatments by Mr. Parrner, and she answered "No." 
(Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.3-6.) Ms. Harris testified in both trials that after the first few treatments, at 
one of the following sessions, Mr. Parmer massaged her buttocks by pushing his hands under her 
shorts and massaged her legs by putting his hands up the legs of the shorts. (Trial Tr., p.332, 
Ls.12-20; p.1269, Ls.8-10.) She also testified that while massaging her buttocks, his thumb 
came "really close to my crotch, between my thighs.'' (Trial Tr., p.335, Ls.6-11; p.1272, Ls.6- 
12; p.1276, Ls.8-13.) At one of the last sessions, while she was lying on her back, Mr. Parmer 
was massaging her neck when he ran his hand between her breasts. (Trial Tr., p.335, L.19 - 
p.336, L.1; p.1272, Ls.13-25.) 
3. Decision on I.R.E. 404(b) Witnesses Identified In State's First Notice of Intent 
On March 28, 2006, the State's Motion in Limine relating to the I.R.E. 404(b) witnesses 
was argued and the district court granted the motion with respect to all witnesses except 
Ms. Burley. (3128106 Motion in Limine Tr., p.26, Ls.1-13.) While the district court heard 
argument, no evidentiary hearing was held and no other evidence was presented. Defense 
counsel sought to continue the trial in order to permit him, further time to investigate the 
witnesses, but that motion was denied, and Mr. Parmer's initial counsel, Mr. Hackney, withdrew 
shortly afterwards for health reasons. (R., pp.29-32.) Attorney Darren Carr took over the 
defense of Mr. Parmer. (R., pp.37-38.) 
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At a hearing on July 5, 2006, it was represented by attorneys for both parties that the 
State was made aware of additional I.R.E. 404(b) witnesses, but would not be calling them to 
testify. (07105106 Hrg. Tr., p.5, L.l - p.6, L.6.) The district court granted the defendant's 
motion to exclude any witnesses that were not disclosed prior to trial. (07105106 Hrg. Tr., p.6, 
Ls.1-6.) At a July 19, 2006 hearing, the parties stipulated to the entry of an exclusionary order 
pursuant to LR.E. 615, which the district court ordered. (07119106 Hrg. Tr., p.9, L.19 - p.10, 
L.9.) 
4. The Second Notice of Intent to Call Additional I.R.E. 404(b) Witnesses 
After the first trial resulted in a mistrial when the jury could not reach a verdict, the State 
filed a Second Motion in Limine, a supporting brief, and a Second Notice of Intent to Use 404(b) 
Evidence ("2nd Notice of Intent"). (R., p.315, Conf. Exs. 6-8.) In the 2nd Notice of Intent, the 
State identified Keri Burley, whom the district court previously ordered could not testify, and 
added the names of Patricia Fery and Trisha Cleveland as witnesses the State anticipated would 
testify to prior bad acts of the defendant. (R., p.315, Conf. Ex. 6.) The proffered and actual 
testimony of these witnesses is set forth below.3 
Patricia Fery - In its 2nd Notice of Intent, the State proffered that Patricia Fery would 
testify that she received physical therapy from Mr. Parmer at the Boise YMCA, and that during 
her treatment, Mr. Parmer performed oral sex on her. (R., p. 3 15, Conf. Ex. 6.) At the second 
trial, Ms. Fery testified that she was 42 years old, married and had three children. (Trial Tr., 
'All facts relating to the proposed testimony of these witnesses is taken directly from the State's 2nd Notice of 
Intent, and all supporting motions and memoranda, unless otherwise specified. Because Keri Burley was not 
allowed to testify at either trial pursuant to the district court's order, her proffered testimony is not addressed. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 13 
p.1245, Ls.17-23.) She testified that she had served as a director on the YMCA board for nine 
years. (Trial Tr., p. 1247, Ls.4-20.) 
Ms. Fery testified she began physical therapy with Mr. Parmer in May of 2002 and that 
her last treatment was in July 2002, during which period she saw Mr. Parmer two times a week. 
(Trial Tr., p.1248, L.10 - p.1249, L.9.) She began seeing Mr. Parmer for a shoulder injury. 
(Trial Tr., p.1248, Ls.10-12.) During a massage session, she testified that Mr. Parmer brushed 
his hand across her breasts and then across her labia. (Trial Tr., p.1255, Ls.5-8.) She further 
testified that Mr. Parmer then moved to the end of the table and began performing oral and 
digital sex on her, and in response, she pulled away and questioned him as to what was going on. 
(Trial Tr., p.1255, L.13 - p.1256, L.5.) According to Ms. Fery, Mr. Parmer left the room at that 
point. (Trial Tr., p.1256, Ls.16-17.) 
Trisha Cleveland - In its 2nd Notice of Intent, the State proffered that Ms. Cleveland 
would testify she was treated by Mr. Parmer at the Downtown Boise YMCA in 2002, and that in 
the first session, Mr. Parmer asked if he could check her chakras, or the energy fields of the 
body. (R., p.315, Conf. Ex. 6.) In doing so, Mr. Parmer moved his hand between her breasts, 
over her abdominal area and just above her pubic area, and then explained that "this area 
represented relationships, sex, and creativity. She will testify that the defendant spent a lot of 
time rubbing her groin." During the third session, Mr. Parmer rubbed her groin, fondled her 
breasts and kissed her. During the fourth session, Mr. Parmer ran his finger under 
Ms. Cleveland's underwear and made contact with her genitals. During the next session, 
Mr. Parmer pressed his penis against Ms. Cleveland while massaging her back, and then started 
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kissing her and fondling her breasts. He then removed her underwear and performed oral sex on 
her and digitally penetrated her. In the next session, Mr. Parmer disrobed and Ms Cleveland 
commented that he was not wearing LDS garments, to which Mr. Parmer stated he was not 
active in the LDS church. Ms. Cleveland then put her mouth up to Mr. Parmer's penis to engage 
in oral copulation, but Mr. Parmer's penis then lost its erection. 
Ms. Cleveland left a note for Mr. Parmer on his car that read: "Dear J, I have given this a 
lot of though (sic) and don't think I can go on with this anymore. I am not good at being a rat 
and need to not see you anymore. I hope you understand. I thank you for what you have taught 
me and I wish you well. Signed T." She returned for another session the next morning due to a 
migraine headache, at which point they discussed the note she had left. At that session, she 
sought to "get to the bottom of his intentions." Thereafter, Ms. Cleveland "told her husband 
what she had done," and called Mr. Parmer to warn him of that fact. Ms. Cleveland's treatment 
ended in October 2002. Ms. Cleveland then submitted a written statement to the Idaho State 
Board of Medicine, reported the situation to the Boise City Police, and sued the defendant. (R., 
p.315, Conf. Ex. 6.) 
During the second trial, Ms. Cleveland testified that she first saw Mr. Parmer at the 
Downtown Boise YMCA in August of 2002 for migraine headaches and continued seeing him 
several times per week until October 10, 2002. (Trial Tr., p.1174, L.6 - p.1176, L.17; p.1207, 
Ls.13-15.) At the first appointment, she testified Mr. Parmer discussed with her the concept of 
chakras or energy fields of the body, and explained three areas to her as he placed his hand on 
each of the three areas: between her breasts, on her abdomen, and on her pubic bone. (Trial Tr., 
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p.1177, Ls.3-25.) She testified about another session where Mr. Parmer started running his 
fingers into her underwear and told her she needed to be woken up sexually. (Trial Tr., p.1180, 
Ls.20-23.) At that point, Mr. Parmer came around to the top of the table and started fondling her 
breasts. (Trial Tr., p.1181, Ls.16-19.) She then got dressed and left. (Trial Tr., p.1182, Ls.1-4.) 
She called him afterwards and asked why he had done what he had, to which he responded by 
stating that he felt a connection with her and "[he] wanted to be a good thing." (Trial Tr., 
p.1182, L.19 - p.1183, L.3.) She went back for another session where she discussed the prior 
situation with him again, told him she was not attracted to him, and saw him as merely a friend. 
(Trial Tr., p.1185, Ls.7-15.) That session took place in the treatment room, and at one point, she 
testified, Mr. Parmer was up on the table massaging her back and started rubbing his penis on her 
bottom. (Trial Tr., p.1188, Ls.10-25.) She testified that she was able to roll over, and that when 
she did, he started kissing her and fondling her breasts. (Trial Tr., p.1189, Ls.1-12.) He then 
pulled her underwear off and performed oral sex on her. (Trial Tr., p.1189, L.25 - p.1190, L.1.) 
Ms. Cleveland testified that Mr. Parmer's assistant, Janet, returned to the room at that point and 
Mr. Parmer stopped. (Trial Tr., p.1190, Ls.6-14.) 
The next appointment took place in the massage room and Ms. Cleveland disrobed of 
everything but her underwear and got under the sheet on the table. (Trial Tr., p.1192, Ls.11-18.) 
Ms. Cleveland brought up the prior situation with Mr. Parmer, and at some point the two kissed. 
(Trial Tr., p.1192, L.19 - p.1193, L.lO.) She then directed Mr. Parmer to remove his clothes and 
he did. (Trial Tr., p.1193, Ls.13-14.) She testified that she commented that he was not wearing 
LDS garments and he told her that he was not active in the church. (Trial Tr., p.1193, Ls.19-25.) 
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Once he completely disrobed, Mr. Parmer got on the table and Ms. Cleveland was kissing him 
while moving down toward his penis. (Trial Tr., p.1194, Ls.2-5.) She testified that as she did so, 
"what had been erect was now completely not." (Trial Tr., p.1194, Ls.2-5.) She asked him 
about it and he responded that it was about control. (Trial Tr., p.1194, Ls.9-10.) She testified 
that she brought up sex and he responded that that would not happen between them. (Trial Tr., 
p.1194, Ls.14-15.) At that point, she testified that Janet knocked on the door so she got up and 
gotdressed. (TrialTr.,p.1194, L.21 -p.1195, L.9.) 
Ms. Cleveland continued to go to Mr. Parmer for treatment, and during those sessions the 
two kissed and discussed their relationship. (Trial Tr., p. 1195, L.25 - p.1198, L.4.) She testified 
that she left him a note on his car that told him she could not continue seeing him. (Trial Tr., 
p.1198, Ls.19-24.) She called his home, she testified, but could not recall when it was. (Trial 
Tr., p.1199, Ls.4-6.) Sometime after leaving the note on his car, Ms. Cleveland had a severe 
migraine and called Mr. Parmer's office to be seen on an emergency basis. (Trial Tr., p.1199, 
L.10 - p.1200, L.7.) During that session, she testified that Mr. Parmer apologized and stated that 
he had intended to be a good thing for her but it had gone wrong. (Trial Tr., p.1200, L.22 - 
p.1201, L.5.) She testified that the following Monday she called and invited Mr. Parmer to lunch 
so they could talk about what was happening between them. (Trial Tr., p.1202, Ls.10-19.) 
Mr. Parmer declined the lunch invitation, invited her to Yoga, and at some point in the 
conversation, after Ms. Cleveland explained that she needed clarification, Mr. Parmer said "What 
is your problem? Didn't we kind of already . . . Didn't we already talk about this. [sic]" (Trial 
Tr., p.1203, L.15 - p.1204, L.1.) She testified that she felt he had brushed her off. (Trial Tr., 
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p.1204, L.1.) When she arrived at the next appointment she brought up the situation with him 
again and the two had a discussion. (Trial Tr., p.1204, L.2 - p.1205, L.7.) Thereafter, she called 
the State Board of Medicine and put together an eight to ten page statement which she dated 
November 7, 2002, and submitted it to the Board. (Trial Tr., p.1206, L.22 - p.1206, L.9.) On 
cross-examination, Ms. Cleveland testified that she had approximately 13 sessions with 
Mr. Parmer and when asked about the first time Mr. Parmer touched her inappropriately, she 
responded: "I believe it occurred on September loth when he had violated me for the first time, 
yes." (Trial Tr., p.1210, Ls.2-7.) She also testified that she joined the downtown "Y" after "all 
the abuse." (Trial Tr., p.1225, Ls.3-12.) 
A hearing was held on August 2, 2006, on the State's Second Motion in Limine relating 
to the I.R.E. 404(b) witnesses, but no sworn testimony was taken. (08102106 Motion in Limine 
Tr., pp.1-41 passim.) The district court ruled on the basis of the State's proffer contained in the 
pleadings and 2"d Notice of Intent. (08102106 Motion in Limine Tr., pp.1-41 passim; R., p.315, 
Conf. Exs. 6-8.) Defense counsel argued that allowing additional 404(b) witnesses just 18 days 
before the second trial was scheduled to begin (August 21,2006) was prejudicial because he did 
not have sufficient time to investigate the claims being made by Ms. Cleveland and Ms. Fery. 
(08/02/06 Motion in Limine Tr., p.19, Ls.3-13.) Defense counsel explained that while he 
received some information relating to Ms. Cleveland prior to the first trial, because the State had 
not included her on its witness list, he did not concentrate his efforts on her testimony. (08/02/06 
Motion in Limine Tr., p.18, L.6 - p.23, L.16.) The State acknowledged that it had not included 
her on its witness list. (08102/06 Motion in Limine Tr., p.20, Ls.14-17.) Defense counsel 
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informed the court that if it were to grant the State's 2" Motion, the defense would need more 
time to prepare for trial. (8/02/06 Motion in LimEne Tr., p.19, Ls.10-13.) Similarly, the defense 
explained, and the State confirmed, Ms. Fery was not previously identified on the witness list, 
and therefore defense counsel would be required to investigate and prepare for her testimony 
within the remaining days before trial. (08/02/06 Motion in Limine Tr., p.18, L.11 - p.20, L.13.) 
Defense counsel asked for additional time, but the district court did not address the request 
except as it related to Ms. Cleveland, denying a continuance. (08/02/06 Motion in Limine Tr., 
p.28,L.20-p.29, L.4.) 
The district court denied the State's motion in limine as it related to Keri Burley on the 
grounds that, in the district court's view, it was an "extramarital relationship with a minor child 
outside of the context [of] providing massage therapy, massage techniques or physical therapy." 
(08/02/06 Motion in Limine Tr., p.25, L.24 - p.26, L.1.) The district court granted the State's 
second motion as it related to Ms. Cleveland and Ms. Fery, on the same grounds as it had the 
other 404(b) witnesses in the first motion: to demonstrate motive, opportunity, intent and 
absence of mistake. (08/02/06 Motion in Limine Tr., p.27, L.11 - p.28, L.5.) 
5. I.R.E. 61 5 Exclusion Order 
During the August 2, 2006 hearing, defense counsel informed the district court that 
Ms. Cleveland had sat through several days of the first trial. (08/02/06 Motion in Limine Tr., 
p.23, Ls.13-16.) The court had previously entered its exclusionary order on Jnly 19, 2006. 
(07/19/06 Hrg. Tr., p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.9.) The district court took no action with regard to 
Ms. Cleveland having sat through several days of the first trial. 
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11, ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Did The District Court Commit Reversible Error Bv Allowing Eight Prior 
Bad Act Witnesses To Testify In The State's Case-In-Chief? 
1. Was It Reversible Error To Relieve The State Of Its Burden To Present Some 
Evidence That The Defendant Had In Fact Committed Prior Bad Acts? 
2. Was It Reversible Error To Allow The State To Present Prior Acts Testimony 
In Its Case-In-Chief When The Testimony Was Irrelevant, Not Presented For 
A Proper 404(b) Purpose, And Was More Prejudicial Than Probative? 
3. Did The District Court Abuse Its Discretion By Permitting Ms. Cleveland To 
Testify Even Though She Attended Several Days Of The First Trial 
Testimony? 
4. Was The Error Of The District Court In Granting The State's Motions In 
Limine Harmless Or Does It Require Vacating Mr. Parmer's Conviction? 
B. Was It  Reversible Error To Preclude The Defense From Eliciting Testimony 
Regarding Officer Gilbert's Interview With Mr. Parmer? 
111. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Committed Reversible Error Bv Allowing Eight 
Prior Bad Acts Witnesses To Testify In The State's Case-In-Chief 
1. It was Reversible Error to Relieve the State of its Burden to Present 
Some Evidence that the Defendant in Fact Committed Prior Bad Acts 
Mr. Parmer asserts that it was reversible error for the district court to grant the State's 
first and second motions in limine, thereby allowing the presentation of prior bad acts testimony 
in the State's case-in-chief in the absence of any evidentiary basis for doing so. Without some 
evidence, the district court had no evidentiary basis for its conclusions of law other than the 
State's summary of the witnesses' testimony. (3128106 Motion in Limine Tr., p.25, Ls.4-5.) In 
the absence of some evidence, the district court abused its discretion by relieving the State of its 
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burden to demonstrate that the evidence met the I.R.E. 404(b) criteria for admissibility. The 
same is true as to the State's second motion in limine. In each instance, the district court granted 
the State's motion even though the State failed to carry its burden. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible to prove a person's character or 
propensity for the purpose of showing he committed the charged offense. State v. Field, 144 
Idaho 559, 569, 165 P.3d 273, 283 (2007); I.R.E. 404(b). Prior crimes, wrongs, or acts may be 
admissible, however, to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. . . ." LR.E. 404(b); Field, 144 Idaho at 559, 165 P.3d 
at 273. A two-tiered analysis is used to determine such evidence's admissibility. Field, 144 
Idaho at 559, 165 P.3d at 273. The court must first find that the evidence is relevant to a material 
and disputed issue concerning the charged offense. Id. Relevance is a matter of law and 
reviewed de novo. Id. If the evidence is relevant, the trial court must then determine whether the 
probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. 
Id. Such balancing is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. Id. When this Court 
reviews a district court's discretionary decision, it conducts a multi-tiered inquiry: first, whether 
the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; second, whether the court acted 
within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to specific choices; and third, whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600,768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 
This Court has yet to explicitly state that which is implicit to the I.R.E. 404(b) analysis: 
there must be a factual basis for the trial court's determination. See I.R.E. 101(e)(l) 
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(inapplicability of rules to issues of fact preliminary to admissibility heard by the court); I.R.E. 
104(a) (preliminary questions of fact determined by the court). Other states have expressly 
required a factual basis for 404(b) evidence and identified the standard of proof by which the 
proponent must show a factual predicate. See Admissibility in criminal prosecution of evidence 
to prove other crime as affected by degree or suficiency ofthe evidence, 3 A.L.R. 784 (1919 and 
Supp.). The majority of states have adopted a clear and convincing standard, but others have 
adopted a preponderance, a sufficient evidence, or a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Id. 
See State v. Terrazas, 944 P.2d 1194, 1197-98 (Ariz. 1997), for a survey of states adopting the 
several standards mentioned above. For example, in the federal system, such evidence is 
admissible on a showing that a reasonable jury could find the defendant committed the act by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Huddleton v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988). While no 
pretrial factual finding is required in the federal system, if the proponent of the evidence fails to 
meet the standard of proof at trial, "the trial court must instruct the jury to disregard the 
evidence." Id. 
Which standard of proof should be adopted is not central to this appeal. Rather, the 
pertinent point is that an evidentiary foundation must be developed on the record to support the 
district court's legal conclusions as to admissibility. It is well-established that this Court reviews 
relevancy determinations, such as those in 404(b) cases, de novo because such determinations are 
questions of law, not of fact. White V.  Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 891, 104 P.3d 356, 365 (2004) 
(citing State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 864 P.2d 596 (1993)). It follows, however, that a 
determination of relevancy cannot be made unless there is some evidence before the court. 
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Where the very nature of 404(b) evidence creates a substantial risk of distorting the 
judicial function, see State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 664 P.2d 772 (1983), it is particularly 
important that the trial court make its decision based on evidence, and not the mere offer of 
proof. The importance of the presentation of evidence is further heightened by the need for the 
trial court to determine whether the offered evidence fits the factual patterns required before 
404(b) evidence may be deemed relevant. For example, whether there is a specific subgroup of 
identifiable individuals targeted, whether striking similarities exist, or whether the offenses were 
part of one continuous action against an individual. See, e.g., Field, 144 Idaho at 567, 165 P.3d 
at 281. 
It should not be surprising that a good prosecutor may frame the offer of proof to meet 
the factual patterns this Court has determined are necessary to the relevancy determination. In 
that event, if the evidence is deemed relevant at pretrial, but at trial falls short of meeting the 
necessary elements for admissibility, a curative instruction to the jury will have little impact in 
terms of "un-ringing the bell." The trial court will also be hesitant to waste judicial resources by 
declaring a mistrial, and most often will simply give the curative instruction. Once 404(b) 
evidence is before the jury, however, it is particularly persuasive, prejudicial, and hard to ignore. 
See Judicial Remedies for the Exposure of the Jury to “irrelevant" Evidence, 34 HOU. L. REV. 
73, 85 11.76 (Spr. 1997) ("most lay persons realize that a person's past conduct has at least some 
value in predicting subsequent behavior.") (citing State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241, 245, 800 P.2d 
771, 775 (Ct. App. 1994) ("a leopard doesn't change its spots" reasoning is antithetical to 
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American law.")); see generally, E. Imwinkelried, 1 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 2: 
19. 
Even though the procedure used in the federal system may not be particularly effective, if 
the proponent of 404(b) evidence fails to meet the standard for admissibility, the judge 
nevertheless instruct the jury to disregard the evidence. Huddleton, 485 U.S. at 690. While 
I.R.E. 404(b) is silent as to the procedure to be employed, it is the duty of the trial judge "to 
devise appropriate techniques to prevent abuse." 22 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. 5 5249 (2008). 
The district court here abandoned that duty by admitting the testimony proffered without any 
factual basis for doing so under I.R.E. 404(b). It was further incumbent on the district court, 
once the witnesses testified, to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony that did not satisfy the 
404(h) criteria. The district court's abandonment of this essential duty occurred at both the 
March 28 and August 2, 2006 hearings when the district court permitted admission of the 404(b) 
witnesses and reaffirmed its earlier ruling. 
It is likely the State will argue that the defendant was free to present testimony or other 
evidence to rebut the testimony of the 404@) witnesses. It should be noted that it was the State's 
motion, and therefore its burden, to demonstrate the relevance and admissibility of the evidence 
it sought to admit. Furthermore, the record demonstrates the defense did not have sufficient 
notice to investigate and prepare for either hearing. Though the State provided notice of its 
intent to use 404(b) evidence, given the number of witnesses and the extensive time period over 
which the events were alleged to have taken place, the earliest being in 1988 (R., p.315, Conf. 
Ex. 2, p.l), the defense did not have a sufficient opportunity to investigate before the March 28, 
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2006 hearing. The Notice of Intent was filed on March 10,2006, and the reports supporting the 
witnesses' allegations were provided on March 9, 2006. (R., p.315, Conf. Ex. 2, p.7.) At a 
March 23,2006 hearing, defense counsel informed the district court that substantial investigation 
into the 404(b) witness issues would be required, and that investigation had yet to be 
accomplished. (3123106 Motion in Limine Tr., p.2, L.5 - p.3, L.3.) The matter was continued 
five days, at which time defense counsel informed the district court that contact information for 
all of the 404(b) witnesses had been provided by the State that day. (3128106 Motion in Limine 
Tr., p.16, Ls.14-23.) Notably, the State had redacted all contact information for each witness 
from the reports provided to defense counsel on March 9,2006. (3128106 Motion in Limine Tr., 
11.16, Ls.14-23.) 
Nevertheless, the district court proceeded with the hearing, without the benefit of a 
factual record upon which to base its legal conclusions, and determined that seven of the eight 
witnesses could testify in the State's case-in-chief. (3128106 Motion in Limine Tr., p.23, L.l - 
p.25, L.13.) After the district court rendered its ruling, the defense sought to vacate and reset the 
trial to allow time to prepare to meet the proffered trial testimony of the seven witnesses. 
(3128106 Motion in Limine Tr., p.26, L.19 - p.30, L.25.) Defense counsel explained to the 
district court that each of the 404(b) witnesses presented a situation that required "a separate kind 
of minitrial within a trial," which would involve substantial investigation. (3128106 Motion in 
Limine Tr., p.27, Ls.1-13.) Defense counsel then clarified that it had just received the Notice of 
Intent on March 10, 2006, just 18 days prior to the hearing and 48 days before trial, which was 
insufficient time to investigate and prepare to meet the allegations of the seven 404(b) witnesses. 
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(3128106 Motion in Limine Tr., p.26, L.19 - p.30, L.25.) The district court, nevertheless, denied 
the motion to vacate the trial date then set for April 27, 2006. (3128106 Motion in Limine Tr., 
p.30, Ls.5-25.) After a change in counsel, the trial was reset for July 20,2006. (R., pp.121-22.) 
As to the initial 404(b) witnesses identified in the State's Notice of Intent, six testified at 
the first trial: Gigi Caleway, Cindy Provence, Carol Hooper, Kandy Moore, Brooke Ourada, and 
Jennifer Harris. (Trial Tr., pp.233-248; pp.249-260; pp.261-278, pp.279-299.) Significant 
variances existed between the representations in the Notice of Intent and what several of the 
witnesses testified to at trial. 
As to Ms. Caleway, her testimony varied from the Notice of Intent in several respects: 
The Notice of Intent represented that Mr. Parmer told her to roll over and expose her bare breasts 
and, when she complied, Mr. Parmer fondled her breasts. (R., p.315, Conf. Ex. 2, p.2.) Her 
testimony at trial was that she was face down on the massage table when Mr. Parmer "felt my 
breasts" from the side. (Trial Tr., p.239, Ls.10-11; p.240, Ls.13-16.) In the second trial, her 
testimony varied further in that she never testified that Mr. Parmer actually touched her breasts 
but instead that he only tried to do so. (Trial Tr., p.1157, Ls.1-3.) Had a pretrial evidentiary 
hearing taken place, it is likely that it would have been revealed that Mr. Parmer did not fondle 
Ms. Caleway's breast as stated in the Notice of Intent. It would have also been revealed that 
Mr. Parmer did not massage her buttocks, but "was kinda around my buttocks too." (Trial Tr., 
p.241, Ls.19-20.) 
As to Ms. Provcnce, her testimony also varied substantially from the Notice of Intent. 
While the Notice of Intent stated that Mr. Parmer put his hand in her vaginal area, she testified 
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that that never occurred. (R., p. 315, Conf. Ex. 2, p.6; Trial Tr., p.253, Ls.19-21; p.1134, L.24 - 
p.1135, L.2.) At the March 28,2006 hearing, the prosecutor made the same representation to the 
district court as it did in its Notice of Intent. (3128106 Motion in Limine Tr., p.17, Ls.22-25.) 
Ms. Provence testified that Mr. Parmer massaged her buttocks area, the area being treated, and 
that as he massaged her, his hands moved toward her inner thigh area. (Trial Tr., p.253, Ls.19- 
21; p.1134, L.24 - p.1135, L.2.) While she said that made her uncomfortable, Ms. Provence 
testified that it was the only time she felt uncomfortable during the almost 20 treatments she had 
withMr.Parmer. (TrialTr.,p.254,Ls.17-21;p.1137,L.l4-p.1138,L.2.) 
As to Ms. Hooper, her testimony varied from what was stated in the Notice of Intent by 
the absence of any testimony regarding her toes being sucked on, or Mr. Parmer massaging her 
breasts. (R., p.315, Conf. Ex. 2, pp.3-4; Trial Tr., p.267, L.4 - p.269, L.25; p.1233, L.10 - 
p.1236, L.12.) 
As to Ms. Moore, her testimony in the first and the second trial varied substantially from 
what was stated in the Notice of Intent. (R., p.315, Conf. Ex. 2, pp.4-5; Trial Tr., p.283, L.7 - 
p.294, L.lO; p.1066, L.16 - p.1105, L.18.) Taken as a whole, Ms. Moore's testimony described 
a consensual sexual relationship in which she was an active participant. While it may have been 
unprofessional of Mr. Parmer to engage in such a relationship with one of his patients, it was 
neither criminal nor similar to the charged offense. The variance of Ms. Moore's testimony from 
the Notice of Intent was so extensive as to be misleading. 
As to Ms. Ourada, she testified fairly consistently with what was stated in the Notice of 
Intent. The one exception was that she testified about a second event where her breasts were 
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exposed to Mr. Parmer, and that event was not disclosed in the Notice of Intent. (R., p.315, 
Conf. Ex. 2, p.5; Trial Tr., p.311, Ls.13-23.) 
As to Jennifer Harris, like Ms. Ourada, she testified fairly consistently with what was 
stated in the Notice of Intent. The one exception was that she testified about Mr. Parmer's 
thumb getting "really close to my crotch" during the massage, which was not disclosed in the 
Notice of Intent. (R., p.315, Conf, Ex. 2, p.5; Trial Tr., p.335, Ls.6-11; p.1272, Ls.6-12; p.1276, 
Ls.8-13.) 
With regard to the testimony of Ms. Caleway, Ms. Provence, and Ms. Moore, the 
variance between their testimony and the Notice of Intent was so substantial as to render their 
testimony inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b). Nevertheless, the district court abandoned its 
gatekeeper function and instructed the jury that it could consider each of these witnesses' 
testimony. (Trial Tr., p.1062, L.21 - p.1063, L.7.) Once the district court heard the testimony 
and was aware that it did not satisfy the 404(b) criteria, it was plain error to not instruct the jury 
to disregard the testimony. 
The State's Second Notice of Intent identified two additional 404(b) witnesses: Patricia 
Fery and Trish Cleveland. (R., p.315, Conf. Ex. 6, pp.3-5.) A hearing was held on August 2, 
2006, where the State again presented no evidence. (08102106 Motion in Limine Tr., pp.1-41 
passim.) The district court granted the State's second motion in limine as to these two witnesses 
on the same grounds as it had with the first group. (08102106 Motion in Limine Tr., p.27, L.11 - 
p.28, L.5.) At that point, the defense sought to vacate the trial in order to have time to prepare to 
meet the new 404(b) evidence, but the district court denied the motion. (08102106 Motion in 
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Limine Tr., p.28, L.20 - p.29, L.4.) Denial of the motion to vacate significantly prejudiced the 
defense's ability to investigate and prepare to meet the testimony of Ms. Cleveland and Ms. Fery, 
and amounted to an abuse of discretion. For that reason alone, this Court should reverse and 
remand for a new trial. 
The variance between the State's proffers and what the witnesses actually testified to 
exemplifies the prejudicial impact of a district court relying upon an unsupported offer of proof 
to determine the admissibility of 404(b) evidence. Mr. Parmer's defense was highly prejudiced 
by the granting of the State's motions in limine without the presentation of some evidence of 
what the witnesses would actually say at trial, as opposed to an investigator's or the prosecutor's 
unsupported interpretations of what the witnesses would say. The district court's error and abuse 
of discretion in admitting the 404(b) witnesses without knowing what the witnesses would say 
was compounded at trial by the district court's failure to exclude, strike or properly instruct the 
jury when the witnesses' testimony failed to meet the 404(b) criteria for admissibility. 
It was therefore reversible error for the district court to grant the State's motions in limine 
and allow prior bad acts evidence to be presented in the State's case-in-chief without a factual 
basis for its legal conclusion that the evidence was admissible. For this reason, this Court should 
reverse and remand for a new trial. 
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2. It was Reversible Error to Allow the State to Present Prior Acts 
Testimony in its (lase-In-Cliief when the Testimony was Irrelcvant, 
Not Presented for a Proper 404(b) Purpose. and was More Preiudicial 
Than Probative 
The district court committed reversible error by permitting the State to present prior acts 
testimony through eight witnesses during its case-in-chief "for the purposes of showing a 
common scheme or plan, or absence of mistake, or absence of accident" and intent. (3128106 
Motion in Limine Tr., p.26, Ls.1-13; 8/02/06 Motion in Limine Tr., p.27, L.ll - p.28, L.S.) 
While "[elvidence of other acts to prove character of a person is generally inadmissible to show 
that person committed the crime for which he is charged[,]" State v. Cardell, 132 Idaho 217,218, 
970 P.2d 10, 11 (1999), it may be admissible to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. See I.R.E. 404(b). This Court has 
previously held that corroboration of a minor victim's testimony in a sex case may be a 
permissible purpose under I.R.E. 404(b) for admitting prior acts evidence. See, e.g., State v. 
Cross, 132 Idaho 667,670-71,978 P.2d 227,230-31 (1999). Most recently, however, this Court 
acknowledged that there are limits to the use of such evidence, even in sex crime prosecutions 
involving minors: 
In sex crime prosecutions involving minors, the admission of 
uncharged deviant sexual misconduct has in many cases been 
"difficult to square ... with the character evidence prohibition." D. 
Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook, § 13.9 (1995). The 
explanation may "be found in the unstated belief that sexual 
deviancy is a character trait of especially powerful probative value 
for predicting a defendant's behavior, and that relaxation of the 
propensity evidence ban is warranted in these cases." Id. 
Nonetheless, there must be limits to the use of bad acts evidence to 
show a common scheme or plan in sexual abuse cases. 
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State v, Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569-70, 165 P.3d 273,283-84 (2007). 
(i) Common Scheme or Plan 
The district court erred in this case when it determined the prior acts testimony tended to 
demonstrate a common scheme or plan. (3128106 Motion in Limine Tr., p.24, L.25 - p.25, L.18; 
8/2/06 Motion in Limine Tr., p.27, L.11 - p.28, L.5.) In Field, 144 Idaho at 559, 165 P.3d at 
273, this Court discussed what elements were necessary to find a common scheme or plan, 
pursuant to Rule 8 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, to justify the joinder of offenses. This Court 
held that the district court erred in joining two charges under I.C.R. 8 that involved different 
victims. Id The Court noted that the facts that both girls resided in the same home temporarily, 
the abuse occurred in the defendant's home, and the abuse began as innocent touching, were 
insufficient to demonstrate a common plan or scheme. Id. In fact, the Court observed that there 
was an absence of striking similarities to connect the two offenses: the two girls were different 
ages, the sexual contact was different, and two years separated the two incidents. Id. In 
analyzing the joinder issue, this Court informed the analysis by reference to its 404(b) cases 
involving common scheme or plan. Id. 
Idaho cases affirming the use of bad acts evidence in sexual 
misconduct cases focus on prior conduct that was actual sexual 
abuse and that was either similar abuse or involved victims of 
similar ages to those abused. 
Field, 144 Idaho at 569, 165 P.3d at 283. "There must be a causal relation or logical and natural 
connection between the two acts, or they must form parts of but one transaction." State v. 
Stoddard, 105 Idaho 533,536,670 P.2d 1318, 1321 (Ct. App. 1983) (quoting State v. Gamey, 45 
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Idaho 768,775,265 P. 668,670 (1928); citing State v. Jones, 62 Idaho 552, 561, 113 P.2d 1106, 
1109 (1941)). Prior act evidence can only be admitted to show a common scheme or plan when 
two acts are so related to each other that the proof of one tends to prove the other. Id. (cifing 
State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 664 P.2d 772 (1983); State v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 591 P.2d 130 
(1979); State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506,584 P.2d 1231 (1978); State v. Boothe, 103 Idaho 187,646 
P.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1982)). 
Here, the 404(b) testimony failed to satisfy the criteria for admissibility to prove a 
common scheme or plan. There were at least three witnesses who testified that their relationship 
with Mr. Parmer, and the contact between them, was consensual-though it may have been 
professionally untenable in the situations of Ms. Cleveland and Ms. Moore. Ms. Provence's 
testimony is particularly troubling in this regard, because she testified that although she was 
made uncomfortable on one occasion, Mr. Parmer never sexually abused her in any way. (Trial 
Tr., p.252, Ls.9-25; p.1133, L.6-p.1135, L.7; p.254, Ls.17-21; p.1137, L.14-p.1138, L.2.) 
The absence of sexual abuse in the testimony of Ms. Cleveland, Ms. Provence, and 
Ms. Moore rendered the evidence inadmissible for the purpose of demonstrating a common 
scheme or plan. To be relevant, the prior act must be a similar to that charged. Field, 144 
Idaho at 569, 165 P.3d at 283. Here, both the State and the district court equated Mr. Parmer 
engaging in unprofessional conduct with consenting adult women, with the charged criminal 
activity. On this basis alone, it was error to admit their testimony. 
Additionally, of dl the 404(b) witnesses, only Ms. Caleway was similar in age to K.R. at 
the time of the alleged event in 1988. Her testimony, however, was not similar to that alleged by 
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K.R. Ms. Caleway testified that while Mr. Parmer tried to touch her breasts, he never actually 
made contact with them. The only commonality between the two appears to be that each act 
took place while Mr. Parmer was giving them a massage. However, even on this point, 
Ms. Caleway acknowledged she had not sought treatment from Mr. Parmer because he was not a 
therapist at the time. (Trial Tr., p.239, Ls.15-18; p.1152, Ls.10-19; p.1153, Ls.7-11.) 
There is also a substantial disparity among the ages of the various 404(b) witnesses and 
K.R. at the time of the alleged acts. Ms. Booper was 42 years old in 1999. Ms. Moore was 28 
years old in 2000. Ms. Ourada was 23 years old in 2000. Ms. Provence was 27 years old in 
2000 or 2001. Ms. Harris was 27 years old in 2005. Ms. Fery was 42 years old in 2002. 
Ms. Cleveland did not testify to her age but she had been married for 16 years in 2002. The 
disparity in the ages of these women compared to 14-year-old K.R. strongly suggests that, if 
anything, the targeted group did not include K.R. The district court stated as much: "Indeed, the 
type of404(b) evidence that the Court permitted in the first trial of this case very much undercuts 
the theory that the defendant is a pedophile attracted to adolescent females." (08102106 Motion 
in Limine Tr., p. 25, Ls.9-13.) 
There is also substantial variance between the witnesses' testimony as to where they were 
inappropriately touched. Ms. Galloway testified Mr. Parmer massaged around her buttocks and 
tried to touch her breasts. Ms. Hooper testified that Mr. Parmer put his mouth on her breast and 
his hand inside her vagina. Ms. Moore described Mr. Parmer bumping up against her underwear, 
touching her vagina, kissing her, and engaging in other consensual sexual contact. Ms. Ourada 
testified that Mr. Parmer's fingers brushed against her vagina during the massage. Ms. Provence 
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testified that Mr. Parrner's hands focused on her buttocks and were moving toward her inner 
thigh, but did not touch her vaginal area. Ms. Harris testified that Mr. Parmer's hands would go 
under her shorts and underwear while he was massaging her buttocks and legs, but that his 
thumb was the only part of him to ever come close to touching her vaginal area. Ms. Fery 
testified that during her massage, Mr. Parrner's hand brushed against her breasts and labia. 
Ms. Cleveland testified that she had an extramarital affair with Mr. Parmer that included multiple 
sexualized and romantic contacts. Of these witnesses, only Ms. Hooper, Ms. Moore, 
Ms. Ourada, and Ms. Fery testified to contact in an area similar to that alleged by K.R. Any 
similarity between K.R.'s allegations and those of Ms. Moore, however, is minimal since 
Ms. Moore was engaged in adult consensual sexual conduct with Mr. Parmer. Thus, the 404(b) 
witnesses' testimony fails to demonstrate a common scheme or plan, and should have been 
excluded. 
(ii) Absence of Mistake or Accident, and Intent 
The 404(b) criteria for admitting prior acts evidence for the purpose of showing absence 
of mistake or accident, or intent, were also not proven or met by the State and should not have 
been admitted into evidence during its case-in-chief. Before prior acts evidence can be admitted 
to demonstrate absence of mistake or accident, or intent, it must be shown that the evidence is 
relevant to a material and disputed issue. Field, 144 Idaho at 569-70, 165 P.3d at 283-84. Here, 
the district court's pretrial ruling permitted the State to present all eight 404(b) witnesses in its 
case-in-chief, before either absence of mistake or accident, or intent, were material and disputed 
issues. Mistake or accident did not become an issue until Mr. Parmer testified on the last day of 
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the trial. It might be argued that Mr. Parmer's confrontation call statements put mistake or 
accident at issue, but it was the that introduced that evidence through Officer Gilbert, who 
testified immediately after Ms. Moore, the State's first 404(b) witness. When Ms. Moore 
testified, neither mistake nor accident was substantially at issue. 
In State v. Cardell, 132 Idaho 217,219-20, 970 P.2d 10, 11-12 (1999), this Court upheld 
the use of prior acts testimony in the prosecution of a masseuse for sexual battery on a 16- or 17- 
year-old to show absences of mistake or accident. However, in that case, the prior acts evidence 
was excluded from the State's case-in-chief and was only allowed into evidence after the 
defendant testified and placed accident, mistake and lack of intent at issue. Id. Here, the prior 
acts testimony came in during the case-in-chief before mistake, accident, and intent became 
material issues in dispute. 
Accordingly, the district court erred in permitting admission of the 404(b) witnesses' 
testimony to show the absence of mistake or accident, or lack of intent, when Mr. Parmer did not 
put these matters at issue. 
(iii) 1.R.E 403 
The second prong of the 404(b) analysis is that if the evidence is relevant, it may only be 
admitted if it is more probative than prejudicial. Field, 144 Idaho at 569, 165 P.3d at 283. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
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I.R.E. 403. Here, the probative value of the prior acts testimony was substantially outweighed by 
the dangers set forth in 1.R.E 403. Thus, the district court abused its discretion by allowing eight 
witnesses to testiEy to prior acts that bore only slight similarity to the charged allegations. 
Defense counsel objected to testimony being allowed at trial from Ms. Fery and 
Ms. Cleveland, stating that it was just more icing on the cake for the State. (812106 Motion in 
Limine Tr., p.18, Ls.14-17.) The State's case consisted of five fact witnesses, one expert 
witness, and eight prior bad acts witnesses. This piling on not only resulted in a needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence, but also unfairly prejudiced Mr. Parmer's right to a fair 
trial. The testimony of Ms. Moore, Ms. Provence, Ms. Caleway, Ms. Cleveland, Ms. Nooper, 
Ms. Fery, Ms. Harris and Ms. Ourada, presented consecutively, could do nothing but ovenvhelm 
the jury, confuse the issues to be hied, and unfairly prejudice Mr. Parmer. 
The probative value of the testimony of Ms. Cleveland, Ms. Moore, and Ms. Provence, as 
already discussed, was slight. Ms. Cleveland and Ms. Moore testified to consensual adult 
behavior. Though morally and professionally questionable on Mr. Parmer's part, the acts were 
not criminal, and bore little similarity to the charged offense. Doubly so for the testimony of 
Ms. Provence. She testified that she was seeing Mr. Parmer for treatment of pain in the right 
buttocks. Mr. Parmer massaged that area and, on one occasion, his hands moved toward her 
inner thigh but never touched her vaginal area. She testified that nothing else ever happened to 
make her uncomfortable. A juror would have to have been quite astute and hyper aware, given 
the litany of prior bad acts testimony, to hear Ms. Provence's testimony and conclude that 
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Mr. Parmer had touched her inappropriately, too. It is precisely this concern that requires courts 
to exercise extreme caution when allowing 404(b) evidence to be presented. 
The problem, as illustrated in this case, is not that the evidence is not probative; it is that 
it is too probative and overwhelms the trier of fact, causing him to grab for that which is most 
useful, most available and most dangerously common: "A leopard does not change its spots" 
approach is, however, antithetical to our system of justice, see Wood, 126 Idaho at 245, 800 P.2d 
at 775, and undercuts the due process right of the defendant to require that the charged offense be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Given the highly prejudicial nature of the 404(b) testimony, in both its nature and 
volume, it is evident that the district court abused its discretion by not excluding some, if not all, 
of the 404(b) witnesses. "Discretion implies not only leeway but responsibility." MCCORMICK, 
HANDBOOK OF LAW OF EVIDENCE, $ 190 (E. Cleary ed. 1972). Here, allowing overwhelming 
amounts of prior act evidence to be presented was not a responsible exercise of the judicial 
function. Rather, it was outside the bounds of discretion and was inconsistent with the legal 
standards set forth by this Court for evaluating the admissibility of 404(b) evidence. Such an 
abuse of discretion requires that this Court reverse Mr. P m e r ' s  conviction and remand his case 
for a new trial free of inadmissible 404(b) evidence. 
3. The District Court Abused its Discretion by Permittinrr Ms. Cleveland to 
Testify Even Though She Attended Several Days of the First Trial 
The district court abused its discretion by allowing Ms. Cleveland to testify at the second 
trial even though she previously attended the first trial, listening to several days of testimony. 
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Furthermore, the district court abused its discretion when it failed to consider Ms. Cleveland's 
attendance at the first trial as an important factor weighing on the I.R.E. 403 determination of 
whether the probative value of her testimony outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. 
On July 19, 2006, immediately before the first trial, the district court issued an order 
excluding all prospective witnesses from the courtroom and precluding prospective witnesses 
from receiving any information of any nature regarding other witnesses' testimony. The court 
then directed all counsel to "notify their prospective witnesses of the order of exclusion and that 
violation of the order will be punished by contempt." (7119106 Hrg. Tr., p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.9.) 
Then, during the August 2, 2006 hearing on the State's second motion in limine, the 
defense objected to the State's motion in limine as it related to the testimony of Ms. Cleveland on 
the grounds that she had sat through several days of testimony during the first trial. (812106 Hrg. 
Tr., p.23, Ls.14-16.) Despite defense counsel having raised the issue, the district court took no 
action and did not address the matter in any way. At a minimum, once aware of the information, 
the court had a duty to diligently inquire into whether Ms. Cleveland's attendance at the first trial 
might taint her offered testimony in the second trial. See AM. JUR. TRIAL $ 182 (court has duty 
to diligently inquire into allegations of sequestration order violation). It was additionally an 
abuse of discretion for the district court to not consider in its I.R.E. 403 analysis that the 
probative value of Ms. Cleveland's testimony and the danger of unfair prejudice may have been 
impacted by the possible tainting of her testimony. The district court's failure to either make 
inquiry or consider this information demonstrates that it failed to perceive the issue before it as 
one of discretion. See McDaniel v. Inland Northwest Renal Care Group, 144 Idaho 21 9,221-22, 
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159 P.3d 856, 858-59 (2007) (consideration in abuse of discretion analysis is whether the issue 
was perceived as one of discretion). 
It does not appear that the district court properly perceived the violation of the 
exclusionary order as bearing upon the I.R.E. 403 discretionary determination of whether the 
probative value of Ms. Cleveland's testimony outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. Her 
exposure to the testimony presented in the first trial likely diminished the probative value of her 
offered testimony, and should have been one of the factors considered by the court. The 
heightened risk that, consciously or unconsciously, her testimony could be tainted to conform to 
the other witnesses' testimony was a factor that should have entered into the court's assessment 
of the danger of unfair prejudice. Slaathaug v. Allstate, 132 Idaho 705, 709, 979 P.2d 107, 11 1 
(1999) (purpose of rule is to avoid witnesses shaping their testimony intentionally or 
unintentionally). Evidentiary rules like I.R.E. 615(a) are an acknowledgement "that exclusion is 
one means to reduce the possibility of a witness shaping his testimony to conform with or to 
rebut prior testimony of others." State v. Ralls, 11 1 Idaho 485,487,725 P.2d 190, 192 (Ct. App. 
1986), citing United States v. Ell, 718 F.2d 291 (9'h Cir. 1983). 
A court's failure to perceive an issue before it as one of discretion, and whether a 
decision was reached in an exercise of reason, are factors this Court considers in determining 
whether a trial court has abused its discretion. McDaniel, 144 Idaho at 221-22, 159 P.3d at 858- 
59. Here, the district court was informed by defense counsel of the issue involving 
Ms. Cleveland's testimony and it appears to have failed to perceive this information as relating to 
both the exclusionary order and the I.R.E. 403 determination before it. The fact that the court 
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did not address the issue in any manner strongly suggests that it failed to consider the issue in its 
I.R.E. 403 determination as to whether her prior acts testimony should be allowed in the State's 
case-in-chief. 
Normally, it would be the defendant's burden to demonstrate how the presence of a 
witness in violation of an exclusionary order "may have been tainted by the witness's exposure 
in the courtroom to other testimony." State v. Cardell, 132 Idaho 217, 221, 970 P.2d 10, 14 
(1999). However, in this case, where defense counsel apprised the court of the situation in the 
context of the court's I.R.E. 403 discretionary determination, it is a sufficient showing of 
prejudice that the court failed to consider that this witness may pose a greater danger of unfair 
prejudice due to the fact that she had sat through days of witness testimony during the first trial. 
Furthermore, it is just this type of issue that underscores the importance of conducting a 
pretrial evidentiary hearing when a trial court is called upon to rule on the admissibility of prior 
acts testimony. Where the district court in this case ruled on the State's motions in limine 
without first requiring the State to present any evidence, whether in the form of live testimony or 
sworn affidavits or other comparable evidence, defense counsel had no opportunity to develop 
the record in a manner that would reveal whether Ms. Cleveland's testimony was tainted by her 
observations of other witnesses' testimony. 
For these reasons, it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to grant the State's 
motion in lirnine allowing Ms. Cleveland's prior acts testimony. The district court's abuse of 
discretion requires the reversal of Mr. Parmer's conviction, and remand for further proceedings. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 40 
4. The Error of the District Court in Granting the State's Motions In Limine 
Was Not Harmless 
The error of allowing the State to present inadmissible I.R.E. 404(b) evidence in its case- 
in-chief was not harmless. The jury in the first trial was unable to reach a verdict, while the jury 
in the second trial reached a guilty verdict only after the district court allowed additional I.R.E. 
404(b) testimony. To find harmless the error of admitting the I.R.E. 404(b) testimony of eight 
witnesses in the State's case-in-chief would ignore everything appellate courts have said, in 
opinion after opinion, warning of the danger of prior bad acts testimony in criminal trials. "To 
hold an error harmless, this Court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there 
was no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction." 
State v. Sheldon, --- P.3d ---, 2008 WL 216302, *5  (Idaho Supreme Court, January 28, 2008). 
Here, where the evidence complained of was highly prejudicial 404(b) testimony in a case where 
there was not overwhelming evidence of guilt, this Court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt 
that there is no reasonable possibility that the 404(b) testimony contributed to Mr. Parmer's 
conviction. Accordingly, Mr. Parmer's conviction should be vacated and the case remanded for 
a new trial. 
(i) Fundamental Error 
Should this Court find that defense counsel failed to preserve the issues argued on appeal, 
a fimdamental error analysis should be undertaken. Under the fundamental error analysis, 
Mr. Parmer's conviction should be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial since the 
volume and nature of the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence allowed at trial was extensive. The district 
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court permitted eight prior act witnesses to testify. By comparison, there were only six witnesses 
who testified in the State's case-in-chief about matters involving the alleged victim. The district 
court's ruling, allowing all eight 404(b) witnesses to testify in the State's case-in-chief, was so 
far out of synch with basic reason, fairness and fundamental justice as to deny Mr. Parmer his 
due process right to a fair trial. The 404(b) evidence presented at trial simply overwhelmed all 
other evidence presented. The district court's admission of prior acts in such volume and 
variable nature so profoundly distorted the trial that it produced manifest injustice and deprived 
Mr. Parmer of his fundamental right to due process. See State v. Hickman, --- P.3d ----, 2008 
WL 1837505, *3 (Idaho Supreme Court, April 25, 2008) ("Error is fundamental if it 'so 
profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his 
fundamental right to due process."') (State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, ---, 170 P.3d 886, 891 
(2007)). 
(ii) Cumulative Error 
While Mr. Parmer asserts that his conviction should be vacated if this Court finds in his 
favor on any of the issues argued on appeal, if this Court finds any one or more errors of the 
district court was harmless, a cumulative error analysis should be undertaken. The "cumulative 
error doctrine requires reversal when there is 'an accumulation of irregularities, each of which 
itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in 
contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to due process."' State v. Field, 144 Idaho 
559,572-73, 165 P.3d 273,286-87 (2007) (quotingstate v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823,965 P.2d 
174,183 (1998)). 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 42 
For all the reasons stated herein, Mr. Parmer was denied a fair trial and this Court should 
vacate his conviction and remand for a new trial. 
B. I t  Was Reversible Error To Preclude The Defense From Eliciting 
Testimony Regarding Officer Gilbert's Interview With Mr. Parmer 
The district court erred by precluding the defense from eliciting testimony regarding 
Officer Gilbert's interview with Mr. Parmer, or otherwise publishing the recording of the 
interview to the jury. (R., p.3 15, Conf. Ex. 7; 08/02/06 Tr., p.37, L.14 - p.38, ~ . 7 . ) ~  The district 
court erred in sustaining the State's hearsay objections to questions relating to Mr. Parmer's 
statements to Officer Gilbert, made during the interview, that defense counsel sought to elicit in 
order to explain the context of statements Mr. Parmer made during the confrontation call with 
K.R. Pursuant to I.R.E. 106, the interview was not barred by the hearsay rules: 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced 
by a party, an adverse party may require that party at that time to 
introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement 
which ought in fairness to be considered conte~nporaneously with 
it. 
Id. Here, the statements Mr. Parmer gave during his interview with Officer Gilbert were in 
response to the contents of the confrontation call with K.R. The confrontation call immediately 
preceded the interview with Officer Gilbert. Because Mr. Parmer's statements to Officer Gilbert 
were recorded and proyided an essential background and context for Mr. Parmer's statements 
during the confrontation call, they are statements which were so closely related that, in fairness, 
they should have been considered contemporaneously with the confrontation call statements. 
While Mr. Parmer believes the transcript provides a sufficient record on which this issue may be decided, he has 
moved by motion to augment to include in the record the audiotape of the confrontation call, (Ex.2, Tr. p.11 IS), and 
the video recording of the interview with Officer Gilbert. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has addressed the scope of I.R.E. 106 in the criminal context in 
two cases. First, in State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 86, 774 P.2d 252, 256 (1989), cert. denied, 493 
US 917 (1989), this Court considered whether the district court erred in denying the defendant's 
request to admit the entire transcribed interview between himself and a police officer who 
testified at trial. The State did not seek to admit the interview at trial, but simply asked the 
officer to recount his recollection of part of the interview. Id. In seeking admission of the entire 
interview, the defendant did not limit his request to those portions of the transcribed interview 
"which explained, qualified or were relevant to that part of the conversation regarding which [the 
officer] testified." Id Had the defendant done so, the Court concluded that "[sluch limited 
portions would have been admissible under then existing Idaho evidentiary practice, which 
practice is now articulated in Idaho Rule of Evidence 106[.Iw Id Because defense counsel had 
not limited his request for admission to only those statements "which might be relevant in the 
context of [the officer's] testimony," this Court found no error in the district court's refusal to 
admit the entirety of the taped interview or the tapes themselves. Id. 
Later, in State v. Bingham, 124 Idaho 698, 699, 864 P.2d 144, 145 (1993), this Court 
considered whether the district court erred in admitting at trial the entirety of the alleged victim's 
CARES (Children At Risk Evaluation Services) interview, at the prosecution's request. The 
prosecution sought introduction of the entire CARES interview on the basis that the interview 
provided context to the alleged victim's inconsistent statements during cross-examination and 
that admission of the entire interview would show the statements were not actually inconsistent. 
Id This Court concluded that I.R.E. 106 governed the admissibility of the CARES interview, as 
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opposed to I.R.E. 801(d)(l)(B), which governs prior consistent statements. Id. In applying 
I.R.E. 106 to the CARES interview, this Court held that "the entire videotape should not have 
been admitted under I.R.E. 106." Id Specifically, this Court cited to its prior decision in Fain, 
116 Idaho at 86, 774 P.2d at 256, and held that the State's failure to tailor its request for 
admission of particular portions of the CARES interview that were relevant in the context of the 
cross-examination statements made by the alleged victim at trial "resulted in the admission of 
patently prejudicial and irrelevant evidence which accompanied the jury even into deliberations. 
Thus, the videotape's admission cannot be justified under I.R.E. 106." Bingharn, 124 Idaho at 
700,864 P.2d at 146. 
Here, defense counsel limited its request for the admission of statements Mr. Parmer 
made to Officer Gilbert which provided context to and the necessary background for 
understanding the statements Mr. Parmer made during the confrontation call with K.R. Because 
the entirety of the confrontation call was admitted as evidence during the second trial, which 
resulted in Mr. Parmer's conviction, the statements sought to be admitted by the defense were 
broad. Nevertheless, Mr. Parmer's statements to Officer Gilbert were based almost entirely upon 
the confrontation call with K.R. and were necessary to give context to the confrontation call 
statements Mr. Parmer made. Moreover, it was vitally important for the jury to know that 
Mr. Parmer's statements during the interview with Officer Gilbert were immediately preceded by 
the confrontation call. This information was necessary to explain and qualify Mr. Parmer's 
confrontation call statements, and was relevant to the entirety of the confrontation call. The 
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statements excluded by the district court are precisely the type of statements this Court deemed 
admissible under I.R.E. 106 in both Fain and Bingham. 
In fairness, Mr. Parmer's statements during the interview with Officer Gilbert should 
have been admitted contemporaneously to the confrontation call tape being admitted, pursuant to 
I.R.E. 106. The district court's refusal to allow admission of Mr. Parmer's interview statements 
was highly prejudicial, particularly where those statements provided explanations for and 
qualifications of statements Mr. Parmer made during the confrontation call. In essence, 
Mr. Parmer's statements during the confrontation call and during his interview with Officer 
Gilbert were so intertwined and interrelated, one could not be fairly considered without reference 
to the other. The refusal to permit defense counsel to delve into the interview statements allowed 
the confrontation calf statements to go unchallenged and unexplained, thereby precluding the 
jury from having any legitimate basis to assess Mr. Parmer's credibility and determine the proper 
weight to give to the confrontation call evidence. Given the fact that Mr. Parmer's conviction 
hinged on the jury's determination of credibility, where there was no physical evidence, such an 
error was devastating to Mr. Parmer's defense. 
Furthermore, it was err to sustain the State's hearsay objection when the plain language 
of I.R.E. 801(d)(l)(B) renders Mr. Parmer's statements to Officer Gilbert during the interview 
non-hearsay. When Mr. Parmer testified, his prior statements were not hearsay because I.R.E. 
801(d)(l)(B) permits the introduction of such statements when they are "consistent with 
declarant's testimony and [are] offered to rebut an express or implied charge against declarant of 
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, . . . ." Id. Throughout the trial the State 
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repeatedly suggested Mr. Parmer's testimony and explanations for the events of December 29, 
2005 were recently fabricated by him for the purposes of trial. Had the district not incorrectly 
perceived the testimony of Mr. Parmer relating to his prior statements as hearsay, the jury would 
have been in a position to assess Mr. Parmer's credibility. Without the prior consistent 
statements, however, the jury would have been, and likely was, left with the distinct impression 
that Mr. Parmer was not credible because he was saying at trial what he had not said on the 
confrontation calf. Without the context of the interview with Officer Gilbert, Mr. Parmer's 
statements in the confrontation call and at trial appeared inconsistent. It was therefore 
prejudicial error for the district court to sustain the State's hearsay objections once the State had 
made the implicit and explicit charge of recent fabrication. 
For these reasons, the district court's error in refusing to admit Mr. Parmer's statements 
to Officer Gilbert under I.R.E. 106 was so prejudicial that it denied Mr. Parmer his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront and cross examine witnesses against him; it denied him of his 
Sixth Amendment right to present a defense; and it denied him his Sixth Amendment right to a 
fair trial. As a result, Mr. Parmer is entitled to a new trial. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the above argument and authority, Mr. Parmer respecthlly requests that this 
Court vacate his Judgment of Conviction and reverse the district court's orders that permitted the 
presentation in the State's case-in-chief of prior bad act testimony; and reverse the district court's 
order that excluded any inquiry into the interview of Mr. Parmer by law enforcement. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1 lth day of July, 2008. 
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